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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
must not only be some evidence tending to support the plaintiff's
claim, but that evidence must be of such quality and quantity as to
justify the jury in basing a verdict thereon in favor of the plaintiff.
10A BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE sec. 6592
(Perm. ed. 1954). Otherwise the application of a rule involving such
uncertain terms would lead into the realm of conjecture and ver-
dicts based on the barest of possibilities. Cleveland-Akron Bag Co.
v. Jaite, 112 Ohio St. 506, 148 N.E. 82, 84 (1925).
There can be no ready test to guide the judge in ruling on the
sufficiency of such circumstantial evidence. Each ruling must neces-
sarily depend upon the nature of the evidence in the case under
consideration. In the words of Justice Cardozo, "One struggles in
vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready touchstone."
Perhaps if the West Virginia Court had embraced the rebuttable
presumption arising from ownership of the vehicle, trial court judges
would have had a yardstick or touchstone to guide them should like
situations arise in the future.
William Thomas Harrison
Evidence--Lie Detector Testimony Admissible on Stipulation
D, accused of possession of narcotics, agreed by written sti-
pulation with his counsel and the prosecution to submit to a poly-
graph (lie detector) test, the results of which were to be admissible
in evidence at trial. A polygraph operator was accordingly allowed
to testify at trial over D's objection, and gave evidence unfavorable
to D. D was convicted and, on a certified question, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that lie detector evidence "has developed to a
state in which its results are probative enough to warrant admissibility
on stipulations," at the discretion of the trial judge. The parties were
given the right to examine (a) the qualifications and training of the
polygraph examiner, (b) the conditions under which the test was
administered, (c) the technique of interrogation used, and (d) any
other matters the trial court deemed pertinent. The jury was in-
structed that polygraph testimony does not tend to prove or disprove
any element of the crime charged, but only indicates that at the
time of the examination the accused was or was not telling the
truth; and it is for the jury to determine the corroborative weight
and effect such testimony should be given. State v. Valdez, 371
P.2d 894 (Ariz. 1962).
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The theory of lie detection by polygraphic interrogation is that
lying causes emotional reactions and disturbances on the part of the
one being examined. These reactions cause involuntary changes in
respiration rate, pulse response, and blood pressure. The polygraph
records these changes and, when the results are interpreted by one
trained in polygraph interrogation and examination, the examiner
will normally form an opinion as to whether the examinee answered
designated questions truthfully. Various studies have been made and
results offered as to the reliability of lie detector tests. One set of
conservative figures indicate that (1) in 75-80 per cent of the cases
examined polygraph results correctly reflect the guilt or innocence
of the accused; (2) inconclusive results were obtained in 15-20 per
cent of the cases examined; and (3) 5 per cent or less is the maximum
margin of provable error. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION 76 (2d ed. 1948). The results indicated were taken
from several thousand polygraph examinations over a period of six-
teen years. Other studies indicate a maximum probable error at 2
to 5 per cent. The primary source of error is the failure to detect
deception on the part of hardened criminals, and therefore the bias
tends toward acquitting the guilty rather than convicting the innocent.
22 TENN. L. REV. 713 (1953). In a five year study involving 4,280
criminal suspects, an accuracy of 95 per cent was claimed, and a sub-
sequent study of some 8,450 persons resulted in the same percentage
breakdown. INBAU & REED, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTER-
ROGATION, 111-12 (3d ed. 1953). On the basis of these and similar
studies, there is authority that polygraph results are as accurate and
reliable as other presently accepted methods of determining facts.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §174 (1954).
The first reported American case involving the admissibility of
lie detector evidence was Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013
(D.C.Cir. 1923). Frye was denied admissibility of the results of a
systolic blood pressure test to which he had submitted. An appeal
court observed that ".... while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific princi-
ple..... (it) must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." This language
has been echoed in almost all subsequent decisions concerning the
admissibility of lie detector evidence. A sole appellate case, People
v. Kenny, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1953), permitted lie detector evidence
in the absence of stipulation. The force of this decision was modified,
if not completely erased, by a subsequent New York decision of the
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same year. People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
The Forte case, without reference to the Kenny holding, denied
the admissibility of lie detector evidence. For a discussion holding the
cases distinguishable, see 29 CORNELL L.Q. 535 (1944). See also
People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595 (1952), indicating
the Forte case is controlling.
The admissibility of lie detector evidence upon stipulation is
not settled, although several states and the District of Columbia, have
admitted this evidence upon stipulation. Trial judges using this pro-
cedure feel it is of substantial aid in sharply disputed issues of fact. 22
TENN. L. REV. 711, 715 (1953). The trend seems definitely to be
in the director of admitting lie detector test results on stipulation,
and possibly a majority of jurisdictions would do so. RICHARDSON,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 10.14 (1961). West Virginia
reports no cases involving the use or attempted use of lie detector
evidence, but admissions and agreements made by parties in open
court are binding if acted upon by the court. McCoy v. McCoy, 74
W.Va. 64, 81 S.E. 569 (1914). For cases where lie detector evidence
was refused, even upon stipulation, see State v. Trimble, 68 N.M.
406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961), and Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606,
50 N.W.2d 172 (1951).
Judicial reluctance to recognize lie detector evidence may be
justified, as even if polygraph tests are properly administered, the
results are subject to error. Extreme emotional tension, physiological
or mental abnormalities, or unresponsiveness on the part of the one
being examined can conceal detection, as can a hardened conscience
or a lack of fear of detection. In addition to the difficulties involved in
testing and interpretation, and the question as to the scientific re-
liability of lie detection devices, the principal case noted that there can
be (1) a tendency for juries to treat polygraph evidence as con-
clusive on the issue of the accused's guilt, (2) a lack of standardiza-
tion of test procedure, and (3) a difficulty in jury evaluation of
polygraph examiner's opinions. There is also a danger that refusal
to submit to a lie detector test, if such tests should become generally
admissable, might be interpreted by a jury as an admission of guilt.
It has been suggested that the right to refuse to submit to a lie detector
test is guaranteed by the principles of due process. 69 -ARv. L. REV.
683 (1955). Criticism of lie detector and similar test results does
not demand their non-acceptance in all fields. Lie detectors have
found wide use and acceptance in industry and in interrogation of
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criminal suspects. 70 YALE L.J. 694, 724 (1961). Lie detectors have
been valuable in determining the validity of paternity claims. 4
DE PAUL L. REV. 31 (1954). It is well settled that confessions
obtained by the use of lie detectors are admissible if otherwise
properly obtained. Annot., 23 A.L.R. 2d 1310 (1952).
In preliminary investigations as distinguished from judicial
litigation, the use of lie detectors seems to have passed beyond the ex-
perimental stage. Several states allow lie detector evidence upon stip-
ulation, and upon the theory that absolute infallibility is not the
standard for admissibility of scientific evidence. The status of lie
detector evidence in West Virginia seems an open question although
the use of polygraph evidence has been advocated in 48 W.VA. L.Q.
37 (1941-2). The eventual admission of lie detector evidence does
appear feasible, with further investigation and research into interroga-
tion techniques, the formulation of standards for polygraph examina-
tions, and the use of multiple scientific techniques to record the reac-
tions of those being examined.
John Everett Busch
Federal Courts-Personal Jurisdiction Not Required in
Transfer to Cure Venue Defect
Anti-trust action was transferred from the district court in state
A to the district court in state B because of improper venue. Court
B dismissed the action on the grounds that court A lacked authority
to transfer the action since it did not have personal jurisdiction over
the Ds. Held, reversed. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1958), permits the
court in the district in which the action is filed to transfer it to
another district, when venue is laid in the wrong district, if it be in the
interest of justice, whether the court in which the action was originally
filed had personal jurisdiction or not. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369
U.S. 463 (1962).
Prior to 1948 if the defendant's objection to improper venue
was sustained the action had to be dismissed, because there was no
machinery to transfer the case. To avoid this harsh rule, in 1948,
Congress enacted a provision which provided for a transfer to a court
in which venue was proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1948). In 1949,
this provision was amended to provide for a dismissal or "if it be in
the interest of justice" to transfer to a district in which it could have
been brought. 28 U.S.C. 1406 (a) (1958). This amendment was
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